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The authors propose that when a message recipient “feels right” from regulatory fit (E. T. Higgins, 2000),
this subjective experience transfers to the persuasion context and serves as information for relevant
evaluations, including perceived message persuasiveness and opinions of the topic. Fit was induced either
by strategic framing of message arguments in a way that fit/did not fit with the recipient’s regulatory state
or by a source unrelated to the message itself. Across 4 studies, regulatory fit enhanced perceived
persuasiveness and opinion ratings. These effects were eliminated when the correct source of feeling right
was made salient before message exposure, supporting the misattribution account. These effects reversed
when message-related thoughts were negative, supporting the claim that fit provides information about
the “rightness” of one’s (positive or negative) evaluations.
Subjective experience is a fundamental aspect of life, often
serving as a source of meaning and information for evaluations.
Accordingly, in one form or other, it has always been a focus of
attitudes and persuasion research. Studies of the effects of subjec-
tive experience on persuasion and attitude formation traditionally
have centered around the conditions under which mood and other
emotional feelings influence people’s judgments, including both
affective reactions to an attitude object and incidental mood states
(see Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Nonaffective phenomenal experi-
ences such as perceptual fluency, feelings of uncertainty, and
ease of retrieval have also recently been explored (e.g., Schwarz et
al., 1991; for reviews, see Clore, 1992; Haddock, 2000). Such
influences of subjective experience can operate through different
processes depending on the judgmental strategy used (Forgas,
1994), including an affect-priming mechanism (e.g., Bower, 1981)
or a feelings-as-information mechanism (e.g., Schwarz & Clore,
1983, 1988). The general purpose of our research was to examine
a new kind of subjective experience that could influence persua-
sion through this latter process—“feeling right” from
regulatory fit.
Feelings-as-Information
Substantial evidence has demonstrated that affective and non-
affective feelings can often function as sources of information in
judgments and decision making (see Clore, 1992; Clore et al.,
2001; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). When one is faced with a judg-
ment, phenomenological experiences can serve an information
function if one implicitly asks “How do I feel about it?” and uses
the experience, at least in part, to answer this question. Although
a person’s feeling state may be used as information when the
judgment is an affective reaction to a target, feelings can convey
information even when the task does not specifically request
feelings toward a target. This latter influence may occur when a
judgment is too complex to compute systematically and needs
simplification or when a judgment naturally lends itself to relying
on feelings, such as judgments of uncertainty.
When the question “How do I feel about it?” is asked, however,
it makes one susceptible to the influence of preexisting feelings
that may be quite irrelevant to the judgment at hand. To the extent
that (a) one cannot discriminate preexisting feelings from feelings
about the target of judgment, (b) one perceives the feelings as
appropriate to the judgment, and (c) one cannot attribute the
existing feelings to another source, then these feelings will likely
serve as relevant information in the construction of a judgment. As
Schwarz and Clore (1996; Schwarz, 2001) noted, the “How do I
feel about it?” question does not need to be asked explicitly, nor do
the feelings have to be consciously attributed to the judgment
target. Unless people have reason to question the appropriateness
or relevance of some experiential state that comes to mind, they
tend to assume that the information it provides is relevant, and they
use it (see also Higgins, 1996).
It should be noted that the failure to discriminate among differ-
ent mood or feeling cues represents one case of a more general
phenomenon of source confusion. It is well known, for example,
that people confuse the sources of episodic experiences (Johnson
& Raye, 1981), the sources of accessibility experiences (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1973), and the sources of excitation experiences
(Schachter & Singer, 1962; Zillmann, 1978). Nonemotional feel-
ings, such as feelings of uncertainty, ease of retrieval, and feelings
of familiarity can also be sources of confusion (see Clore, 1992).
Our studies examined a new type of nonemotional subjective
experience whose impact on persuasion has not yet been investi-
gated—the experience of feeling right that is produced by regula-
tory fit.
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388Regulatory Fit: When the Manner of Goal Pursuit
Sustains a Regulatory Orientation
Certain strategic means, behaviors, or cognitions sustain or fit
one’s current phenomenological state (e.g., one’s mind-set, mood,
or regulatory focus) better than others do. When a behavior,
cognition, or strategic mean naturally sustains a given phenome-
nological state, it will not only be the dominant response tendency
but will also have an additional experiential quality of value from
fit (see Higgins, 2000, 2002). In the case of goal pursuit, strategic
means can vary in the extent to which they sustain one’s goal
orientation. For example, when people high in need for closure
(Kruglanski, 1996) are deciding whether to agree with an advo-
cated position, making the decision in a quick manner (e.g., basing
one’s opinion on an initial reaction) would provide a better fit than
a strategy requiring extensive cognitive activity (e.g., thoroughly
analyzing all the arguments).
The broad concept of fit in goal pursuit concerns the relation
between an individual’s regulatory orientation to an activity and
the manner in which that activity is pursued. Individuals can
pursue the same goal activity with different regulatory orientations
and in different ways. Higgins (2000, 2002) proposed that inde-
pendent of valued outcomes, people experience a regulatory fit
when they pursue a goal in a manner that sustains their regulatory
orientation. When there is regulatory fit, the manner of goal pursuit
feels right and increases the value of what a person is doing—
value from fit. Value from fit can be transferred to other value
experiences. Feeling right from regulatory fit, for example, has
been shown to transfer to monetary evaluations of a chosen object
and to moral evaluations of a conflict resolution (see Avnet &
Higgins, 2003; Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003; Higgins, Idson,
Freitas, Spiegel, & Molden, 2003).
Although the experience of value from regulatory fit is a broad
theory applicable to a variety of motivational orientations, the
present studies focus specifically on the predictions of regulatory
focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998b). This theory distinguishes
between two distinct regulatory orientations and the strategic
means that best fit each. A promotion focus represents goal pursuit
in terms of hopes and aspirations (ideals) and entails an orientation
toward accomplishment and a sensitivity to the presence and
absence of gain/nongain outcomes. A prevention focus represents
goal pursuit in terms of duties and obligations (oughts) and entails
an orientation toward security and a sensitivity to the presence and
absence of nonloss/loss outcomes. (Regulatory focus is a state that
can be investigated either as a chronic tendency or a situationally
induced focus.)
It has been shown that different strategic means used during
goal pursuit fit differently with each regulatory orientation (e.g.,
Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Liberman, Molden, Idson, & Higgins,
2001; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). There is a natural fit
between promotion focus concerns and pursuing goals with eager
means (in signal detection terms, ensuring hits and ensuring
against errors of omission), given that both are concerned with
gains and nongains. There is also a natural fit between prevention
focus concerns and pursuing goals with vigilant means (ensuring
correct rejections and ensuring against errors of commission),
given that both are concerned with nonlosses and losses (see
Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Note that although eagerness is an
approach strategy, it can involve both positive responses to an
input (for hits) and negative responses (for misses). Similarly,
although vigilance is an avoidance strategy, it can involve both
positive responses to an input (for correct rejections) and negative
responses (for mistakes or false alarms).
As an example of regulatory fit, consider two students who both
want to earn an A in a course but differ in their regulatory focus
toward this goal. Although the desired end state is identical in both
cases, a student with promotion focus concerns conceives of this
goal as an accomplishment or aspiration, and so eager means for
achieving this goal (reading beyond the required course material)
would provide the better fit for this student. The student with
prevention focus concerns, on the other hand, conceives of this
same goal as a responsibility or duty, and so vigilant means for
achieving this goal (being careful to fulfill all course requirements)
would provide the better fit for this student. Both students will
have valued outcomes from receiving an A in the course, yet
independent of outcome value, the students will experience addi-
tional value if they pursue their goals with the strategic means that
fit their regulatory focus.
What does it mean, subjectively, for one to experience regula-
tory fit? Recent research has found that regulatory fit influences
motivational intensity during goal pursuit, prospective feelings
about a future choice, retrospective evaluations of past decisions,
and value assigned to a chosen object (see Higgins, 2000). There
is evidence that tasks and decisions are evaluated more positively
when they are conducted with regulatory fit, independent of out-
comes (see Freitas & Higgins, 2002; Freitas, Liberman, & Higgins,
2002; Higgins, 2000). There is also evidence that feeling right
from regulatory fit produces a feeling of importance and correct-
ness that can be transferred to evaluations of objects, including
policy issues (Camacho et al., 2003; Higgins, Idson, et al., 2003).
For example, Higgins, Idson, et al. (2003) had participants choose
between a coffee mug and an inferior pen in a way that either fit
their orientation (eager/promotion; vigilant/prevention) or did not
fit (vigilant/promotion; eager/prevention) and found that the mon-
etary value of the chosen object (all participants chose the mug)
was substantially greater in the fit condition.
Regulatory Fit, Feeling Right, and Persuasion
The general purpose of our research is to consider how feeling
right from regulatory fit can influence persuasion. Persuasive
messages usually involve some goal to be attained (e.g., a tuition
increase) and some means described as the way to attain it (the
arguments in support of the advocated position). These arguments
can be framed in terms of either gains/nongains or nonlosses/
losses. For example, when advocating a tuition increase to attain
the goal of high quality teachers and student services, one could
frame the arguments in terms of eagerly ensuring gains (if you
raise tuition, the quality of the teachers and the student services
will be high) or in terms of vigilantly ensuring nonlosses (if you do
not raise tuition, the quality of the teachers and the student services
will not be high). We propose that when the strategic means
(arguments) reflected in a persuasive communication fit the regu-
latory focus of the message recipient, the recipient should experi-
ence regulatory fit and feel right.
Like other subjective experiences, there are several possibilities
regarding how and whether this feeling of rightness is transferred
in the persuasion context. Every persuasion context contains mul-
tiple attributes (e.g., the source, message, advocated position, etc.),
and feeling right could be transferred to any of these attributes for
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about the attribute. One possibility is that feeling right could be
transferred to one’s experience of the message, such that the
feeling of rightness is used as evidence in one’s evaluation of the
message’s perceived persuasiveness; in this case, perceived mes-
sage persuasiveness would be enhanced under conditions of fit.
Another possibility is that the feeling right experience could be
transferred directly to one’s opinion of the topic of the message,
such that this experience is used as information in one’s evaluation
of the advocated position; this would result in more message-
congruent attitudes under conditions of fit. These are clearly not
incompatible possibilities—because both the message and its topic
are relevant aspects of the persuasion context, feeling right can
serve as information for both these judgments. These possibilities
were examined in our studies.
In both of the above cases, feeling right would be experienced
as relevant information, and thus people should use this feeling as
evidence when answering the implicit question, “How do I feel
about it?” In the persuasion context, relevant evaluations can
include the perceived persuasiveness of the message itself and
one’s attitude toward what is being advocated. But what if the
feeling right experience is not considered to be a relevant source of
information for these judgments? For example, consider the classic
Schwarz and Clore (1983) research, in which sunny versus rainy
weather influenced life satisfaction evaluations when weather was
not made salient as a possible cause of participants’ mood, but it
did not do so when participants’ attention was drawn to it as a
source of good or bad mood. In the latter case, good or bad mood
from the current weather was not relevant to evaluations of one’s
general life satisfaction.
What matters, then, is whether the feeling right experience is
considered to be relevant as evidence for the evaluation being
performed (Schwarz & Clore, 1996; see also Foerster & Strack,
1998; Sinclair, Mark, & Clore, 1994). Regulatory fit and value
transfer theory states that feeling right transfers to the evaluation of
the object, not to the object itself. For example, in the Higgins,
Idson, et al. (2003) coffee mug studies, feeling right from regula-
tory fit influenced the process of evaluating the mug, increasing
the positive evaluation. It is not that the mug itself feels right but
that feeling right is used as evidence in the evaluation at hand.
When Higgins, Idson, et al. drew participants’ attention to the
correct source of their feeling right experience, thereby making
this experience not relevant for the price evaluation, regulatory fit
no longer increased the price of the mug. Therefore, a third
possibility is that feeling right will not be transferred in the
persuasion context at all if it is not considered relevant—for
example, if it is made apparent that the source of feeling right is
independent of this persuasion context. This technique of blocking
misattribution, or reattribution of the feeling right experience, is
used in Study 3 to test this possibility.
Finally, there is a fourth possibility for how feeling right could
be transferred in a persuasion context. When feeling right is
experienced as relevant to the evaluations in the context, we
predict that regulatory fit will influence those evaluations. We
expect that the experience of regulatory fit will generally increase
the perceived persuasiveness of a message and one’s agreement
with what is being advocated. However, this need not always be
the case. The impact of feeling right from regulatory fit will
depend on what it is that one is feeling right about. For example,
it will have a different effect if the cognitive responses in a
persuasive context are negative rather than positive. Feeling right
about one’s negative responses to a message, for instance, would
decrease rather than increase the persuasiveness of the message.
The feeling right experience would be information about the
rightness of one’s negative evaluation of the message. Thus, when
participants’ thoughts in response to a message are predominantly
positive, which would be the usual case in our studies, then
regulatory fit should increase persuasion, but when the thoughts
are predominantly negative, then regulatory fit should decrease
persuasion. This possibility was examined in Study 4 by adding a
classic thought-listing procedure (see, e.g., Brin ˜ol & Petty, 2003;
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Greenwald, 1968).
Studies 1 and 2 manipulated the eager versus vigilant framing of
the persuasive message, where an eager manner fits a promotion
but not a prevention focus orientation, and a vigilant manner does
the reverse. Regulatory focus was experimentally induced in Study
1 by emphasizing either accomplishment-related promotion con-
cerns or safety-related prevention concerns for the same goal of
eating more fruits and vegetables. In Study 2, regulatory focus was
a chronic individual difference. Both studies predicted that regu-
latory fit would increase message effectiveness.
Because regulatory fit in Studies 1 and 2 involved the relation
between participants’ orientation and the framing of the message,
other kinds of compatibility between participants’ needs and mes-
sage fulfillment of those needs might have contributed to the
results. For example, as discussed in more detail at the end of the
article, one might conceptualize the predicted regulatory fit effect
as being a special case of message matching, where the match is
between the regulatory concerns of a message recipient and the
persuasive framing of a message. There is substantial evidence that
matching the topic of a persuasive message to some aspect of the
message recipient’s cognitive, motivational, or affective system
can influence persuasion. These characteristics can include, for
example, the psychological functions served by the recipient’s
attitudes (e.g., Clary, Snyder, Ridge, Miene, & Haugen, 1994;
Petty, Wheeler, & Bizer, 2000), the recipient’s culture (e.g., Han &
Shavitt, 1994), the cognitive or affective basis of one’s attitude
(e.g., Fabrigar & Petty, 1999), and the recipient’s chronic self-
guides (e.g., Evans & Petty, 2003). Methodologically, the best way
to clearly distinguish a message-matching viewpoint from our
proposal that regulatory fit increases persuasion through a feeling
right transfer in the persuasion context is to experimentally induce
regulatory fit prior to and independent of the persuasion context.
Our unique prediction is that participants will be more persuaded
by an identical message if they have, versus have not, experienced
regulatory fit prior to even receiving the message. This prediction
was tested in Studies 3 and 4.
In addition to extending the literature relating subjective expe-
rience and persuasion, the present studies extend the literature on
regulatory fit (and regulatory focus) in a number of ways. First,
these studies tested for the first time novel predictions for the
different effects of feeling right from regulatory fit on persua-
sion—predictions of a positive effect, a negative effect, or no
effect. Next, the second study tested whether a regulatory fit effect
can occur when the manner of goal pursuit concerns not one’s own
strategic means but, instead, the means used by others to carry out
the policy they advocate. The third study provides evidence that
the influence of regulatory fit on persuasion is due to a misattri-
bution or transfer of feeling right, and, finally, the fourth study
demonstrates the importance of thought valence in response to a
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effects.
Study 1
The participants in this study were given a persuasive message
describing the importance of more fruits and vegetables in one’s
daily diet. Emphasizing either the accomplishment concerns or the
safety concerns of eating more fruits and vegetables served to
temporarily induce either a promotion focus or a prevention focus,
respectively. Additionally, within each regulatory focus condition,
the message was experimentally framed in terms of either eager
means (i.e., presence and absence of gain/nongain information) or
vigilant means (i.e., presence and absence of nonloss/loss infor-
mation). After reading the communication, participants rated how
persuasive they found it and expressed their intention to consume
more fruits and vegetables. For both these variables, it was pre-
dicted that when the promotion system had been activated, partic-
ipants would give more positive ratings with eager means framing
than vigilant means framing, whereas the reverse would be true
when the prevention system had been activated. Thus a Type of
Regulatory Focus  Type of Means interaction effect on persua-
sion was predicted.
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 106 Columbia University undergraduates (50 men, 56
women) who were paid for their participation. They were recruited through
the use of flyers posted around the Columbia campus. The study was a 2
(type of regulatory focus: promotion [accomplishment] vs. prevention
[safety])  2 (type of means: eager [gain/nongain framing] vs. vigilant
[nonloss/loss framing]) between-participants design. No gender differences
were found for any dependent measures, so all analyses are collapsed
across this variable.
Procedure
Participants were informed that they were participating in an experiment
studying the nutritional habits of college students. Participants were asked
questions about their current nutritional practices and then read a message
designed to persuade them to improve these habits. It was explained that
they would be asked to evaluate the message in order to give the investi-
gators feedback to help them “develop more effective messages.” On
arriving at the experimental session, participants were given a booklet that
consisted of the following items, in order: a cover letter, the Food Habits
Questionnaire (FHQ), the persuasive message, and the message evaluation
measure. Participants were then paid and fully debriefed.
Materials
FHQ. The FHQ was designed to measure participants’ premessage
attitudes toward fruits and vegetables. Participants were first asked to
answer a number of questions regarding their general eating and drinking
habits, included to conceal the true purpose of the measure. Participants
were then asked to indicate their overall attitude toward vegetables and
fruits on a 7-point scale from 1 (very negative)t o7( very positive).
Persuasive message. Each persuasive message was approximately 150
words in length. Regulatory focus was manipulated by describing different
concerns associated with eating fruits and vegetables. The message with a
promotion focus emphasized a concern with accomplishment, and the
message with a prevention focus emphasized a concern with safety. In the
promotion focus essay, for example, the following sentence emphasized
increased energy and general fulfillment: “A diet rich in essential nutrients,
like those found in fruits and vegetables, has direct effects on the biochem-
istry of the brain, resulting in increased energy, better moods, and a general
sense of happiness and fulfillment.” In the prevention focus essay, for
example, the following sentence emphasized protection from harmful daily
elements: “Eating fruits and vegetables supplies the body with the nutrients
it needs, enabling the body to produce substances from within which buffer
it from the physical demands of the world we live in (pollution, daily stress,
bad weather, etc.).”
Within each regulatory focus essay, the message was also framed in
terms of either eager means or vigilant means. In the prevention focus
essay, an example of eager means (gain/nongain) is “if you eat the right
amount of fruits and vegetables, you can actively help keep yourself safe
from illness and obtain overall good health”; an example of vigilant means
(nonloss/loss) is “if you do not eat the right amount of fruits and vegeta-
bles, you cannot actively help keep yourself safe from illness and facilitate
overall good health.”
The complete text of the promotion focus essay can be found in Appen-
dix A, and the complete text of the prevention focus essay can be found in
Appendix B; both texts contain the eager and vigilant framing differences
in brackets. It should be noted that the content of the messages only varied
by focus and that within a focus the content was the same. Only the means
framing of the persuasive messages differed within each regulatory focus
condition. In addition, all messages advocated the same desired goal of
eating more fruits and vegetables.
Dependent Measures
Message evaluation measure. The message evaluation measure asked
participants to indicate in the following order (a) their intention to eat more
fruits and vegetables, from 0 (not at all)t o6( a great deal); (b) the
believability of the message, from 1 (not at all)t o7( completely); and (c)
their postmanipulation attitude toward fruits and vegetables, from 1 (very
negative)t o7( very positive). Item b served as a measure of the perceived
persuasiveness of the message.
Results and Discussion
Analysis Overview
The most direct test of the value from fit hypothesis is a Type of
Regulatory Focus  Type of Means interaction when predicting
both intention to eat more fruits and vegetables
1 and perceived
persuasiveness of the message. The results supported these
predictions.
Intention Ratings
A 2 (type of regulatory focus)  2 (type of means) univariate
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with intention ratings as the de-
pendent measure yielded no significant main effects (ps  .36).
There was a significant interaction, F(1, 102)  4.22, p  .04.
This interaction reflects the fact that participants in the promotion
condition showed greater intention ratings with eager framing
(M  2.52, SD  1.77) than with vigilant framing (M  1.96,
SD  1.85), t(102)  1.17, p  .24, whereas the reverse was
true for participants in the prevention condition, who showed
1 Because the persuasive message advocates eating more fruits and
vegetables, not merely liking them more, we chose ratings of intention to
represent the primary measure of message effectiveness. However, analy-
ses using attitude change (postmessage attitudes minus premessage atti-
tudes) as a dependent variable yield identical results.
391 REGULATORY FIT AND PERSUASIONgreater intention ratings with vigilant framing (M  2.97, SD 
1.74) than with eager framing (M  2.14, SD  1.49), t(102) 
1.73, p  .09.
Perceived Message Persuasiveness
Ratings of perceived message persuasiveness (believability
scores) were submitted to a 2 (type of regulatory focus)  2 (type
of means) univariate ANOVA. An unpredicted main effect of
regulatory focus was observed, F(1, 102)  24.21, p  .001, with
greater perceived persuasiveness ratings for participants in the
prevention focus condition (M  5.47, SD  1.51) than the
promotion focus condition (M  3.85, SD  1.83). With respect to
our central hypothesis, the predicted interaction between type of
regulatory focus and type of means was significant, F(1, 102) 
3.88, p  .05, with prevention focus participants having higher
ratings when exposed to vigilant means (M  5.71, SD  1.42)
than eager means (M  5.14, SD  1.61), and promotion focus
participants having higher ratings when exposed to eager means
(M  4.17, SD  1.77) than vigilant means (M  3.46, SD 
1.86). Planned contrasts revealed that although the interaction was
significant, neither within regulatory focus means difference
reached conventional levels of significance.
Overall, the results of Study 1 are encouraging for the hypoth-
esis that regulatory fit can increase the perceived persuasiveness of
a communication and agreement with its message. A limitation of
Study 1 is that because regulatory focus was manipulated through
different concerns (accomplishment vs. safety), the content of the
message was not the same across regulatory focus framing condi-
tions. Study 1 also did not measure participants’ mood after
receiving the persuasive message. Consistent with previous re-
search on feeling right from regulatory fit, we expect regulatory fit
to increase persuasion independent of simply how good or bad the
message makes participants feel, because feeling right is more than
just feeling pleasure or pain (see Camacho et al., 2003; Higgins,
Idson, et al., 2003). Of course, positive mood could have its own
independent effect on persuasion. To examine this, it is necessary
to measure participants’ mood. Study 2 was designed to address
both these limitations of Study 1. Study 2 also extended Study 1 by
examining regulatory focus as a chronic individual difference
rather than as a situationally manipulated variable.
Study 2
This study measured participants’ chronic regulatory focus and
manipulated whether a persuasive message advocating a new
policy used either eager or vigilant means framing. It was pre-
dicted that participants for whom the strategic means of the per-
suasive message fit with their chronic regulatory focus would
experience value from fit. This “feels right” experience from fit
would transfer to the persuasion context, resulting in increased
perceived persuasiveness ratings and agreement with the propos-
al—a Type of Regulatory Focus  Type of Means interaction on
perceived persuasiveness and opinions. Because the outcome and
information content of the persuasive message are essentially the
same for all participants, any persuasion effects resulting from the
Regulatory Focus  Type of Means interaction must be from
regulatory fit and not from differences in the message received
(i.e., message matching). A measure of positive mood was also
obtained to test whether the effect of regulatory fit on persuasion
is independent of positive mood, as hypothesized.
Method
Participants and Design
Eighty-six students at Columbia University voluntarily participated in
the experiment in exchange for $7. Participants were recruited through the
use of flyers posted around the campus. The study was a 2 (type of
regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention)  2 (type of means: eager vs.
vigilant) between-participants design. Gender data were not available for
this study.
Procedure
Each participant completed the study individually. After giving written
consent, participants were seated in individual soundproof booths and told
the experiment contained two unrelated studies. For the first study, partic-
ipants completed the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ) and one other
self-regulation measure unrelated to the current article. For the second
study, participants were given either the eager means or vigilant means
version of the persuasive communication and the dependent measures in
the order listed below. Following completion of the questionnaire, partic-
ipants were debriefed and paid for their participation. No participant
expressed awareness of the two studies being related in any way.
Materials
Assessment of regulatory focus. The RFQ (Higgins et al., 2001) was
used to measure participants’ chronic regulatory focus, operationalized as
the subjective history of promotion success versus prevention success.
According to achievement motivation theory (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Mc-
Clelland, 1951; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953), feelings
associated with a previous achievement task are elicited when a new task
is encountered. If one has a subjective history of success with past task
engagements, a new achievement task can elicit feelings of pride, and if
one has a subjective history of failure, a new task can elicit feelings of
shame. In the former case, this pride would serve to energize and direct
behavior toward approaching the new goal. In the latter case, this shame
would serve to energize and direct behavior toward avoiding the new goal.
Regulatory focus theory expands on this classic framework by distin-
guishing between two distinct kinds of achievement pride—promotion
pride and prevention pride. A history of success with promotion-related
eagerness (promotion pride) orients the individual toward using similar
eager means on encountering a new task goal; conversely, a history of
success with prevention-related vigilance (prevention pride) orients the
individual toward using similar vigilant means on encountering a new task
goal. Thus, measuring individuals’ subjective history of success with using
either promotion-related eagerness or prevention-related vigilance taps
their strategic inclinations for new task goals.
2
The RFQ is an 11-item measure, with participants rating their history of
promotion and prevention success and failure on 5-point scales from 1
(never or seldom)t o5( very often). Regulatory focus can be analyzed as a
continuous variable with separate orthogonal scales for promotion pride
and prevention pride. Additionally, it is possible to examine individual
differences in either predominant promotion pride or prevention pride. In
this case, the RFQ can be computed as a single categorical variable using
a median split on the difference score of promotion pride minus prevention
pride. Evidence of both the validity and reliability of the RFQ was reported
in Higgins et al. (2001).
2 Regulatory focus applies to avoidance of undesired end states as well;
because most of the research to date has focused on approaching desired
end states, we restrict our discussion to this aspect of goal pursuit.
392 CESARIO, GRANT, AND HIGGINSPersuasive communication. An article outlining the benefits of a new
student after-school program was designed specifically for this study; a
copy can be found in Appendix C. The purported purpose of this article
was to elicit support for applying a new city tax toward an after-school
program that would help elementary and high school students in their
personal and academic lives. The article was written in two formats, using
either eager means (738 words) or vigilant means (753 words) to advocate
the program. The structure, content, and primary goal of the article was
identical for both versions. The only difference concerned the type of
strategic means framing used to advocate the policy. The following are
examples of eager versus vigilant framing used in the article: “The primary
reason for supporting this program is because it will advance children’s
education and support more children to succeed” (eager means; italics
added); “The primary reason for supporting this program is because it will
secure children’s education and prevent more children from failing” (vig-
ilant means; italics added).
Such differences were scattered throughout the text, with 16 sentences
framed in either eager or vigilant terms while the desired goal was held
constant across both conditions. The other sentences, which described the
specific details of the program, were constant across conditions.
Dependent Measures
Perceived persuasiveness of article. This scale measured participants’
perceptions of the persuasiveness of the article on a scale from 1 (not at all)
t o7( very). The measure consisted of four items tapping how persuasive,
convincing, effective, and coherent participants perceived the article to be.
A perceived persuasiveness index was created by averaging scores for
these four items (  .87).
Opinion of proposal. This served as the primary measure of partici-
pants’ attitudes toward the program outlined in the persuasive message and
thus served as the measure of message impact on attitudes. Participants
rated their “overall opinion of the proposal” on a 7-point scale from 1 (very
negative)t o7( very positive).
Positive mood index. Four items assessed participants’ ratings of how
“happy,”“ pleased,”“ overjoyed,” and “cheerful” they felt while reading the
essay on a scale from 1 (not at all)t o7( very). The scores for these four
items were combined to represent positive mood (  .91).
Results and Discussion
Analysis Overview
As in Study 1, the most relevant test of the value from fit
hypothesis is a Type of Regulatory Focus  Type of Means
interaction when predicting persuasiveness and opinions.
3 Follow-
ing Aiken and West (1991), all continuous variables were
centered.
Perceived Message Persuasiveness
Perceived persuasiveness scores served as the dependent vari-
able in a 2 (type of regulatory focus: predominant promotion pride
vs. predominant prevention pride)  2 (type of means: eager vs.
vigilant) univariate ANOVA. Figure 1A presents the means for the
different conditions. Results showed only the predicted interaction
to be significant, F(1, 82)  4.04, p  .05. Promotion focus
participants perceived the communication as more persuasive
when it was framed in terms of eager means (M  4.66, SD 
1.24) rather than vigilant means (M  4.18, SD  1.32); preven-
tion focus participants perceived it as more persuasive when it was
framed in vigilant means (M  4.86, SD  1.00) than in eager
means (M  4.35, SD  0.94). Neither of the within-focus
differences achieved conventional levels of significance.
Opinion of Proposal
The means for opinion of proposal scores are presented in
Figure 1B. Opinion ratings were submitted to a 2 (type of regula-
tory focus)  2 (type of means) univariate ANOVA; 1 participant
failed to respond to this item. This analysis yielded an unpredicted
main effect of RFQ, F(1, 81)  7.43, p  .008, with prevention
focus participants (M  5.48, SD  1.05) being more persuaded
by the message than promotion focus participants (M  4.72,
SD  1.51). No main effect of essay means type was observed
(F  1).
More important, the predicted interaction between type of reg-
ulatory focus and type of means was significant, F(1, 81)  5.54,
p  .02. As expected, planned contrasts revealed that promotion
focus participants were more persuaded by eager means (M 
5.06, SD  1.37) than vigilant means (M  4.30, SD  1.59),
t(81)  1.97, p  .05, and prevention focus participants were
nonsignificantly more persuaded by vigilant means (M  5.72,
SD  1.05) than eager means (M  5.17, SD  0.99), t(81) 
1.37, p  .17.
Positive Mood Ratings
The influence of positive mood on participants’ opinions of the
proposal and perceived message persuasiveness was consistent
with previous research on mood-congruent effects in evaluative
judgments. Regression analyses revealed a significant relation
between positive mood and opinions, B  0.56, t(83)  6.05, p 
.001, and perceived message persuasiveness, B  0.29, t(84) 
3.22, p  .002. In both instances, higher positive mood ratings
related to more positive evaluations. It is important that conditions
of regulatory fit did not significantly predict positive mood, B 
0.23, t(82)  1, p  .50. Thus, as expected, regulatory fit is not
synonymous with positive mood (see also Higgins, Idson, et al.,
2003).
Value From Fit and Positive Mood: Independent Paths
We propose that feeling right from regulatory fit is not the same
as feeling good or positive mood. To demonstrate this indepen-
dence, we separately regressed perceived persuasiveness and opin-
ion ratings on both a regulatory fit interaction term (Type of
Regulatory Focus  Essay Means Type) and positive mood ratings
to demonstrate that the regulatory fit effects on these variables
remain when controlling for positive mood. For perceived persua-
siveness ratings, regulatory fit effects were still significant when
positive mood ratings were included, B  0.30, t(81)  1.98, p 
.05, and the same was true for opinion of proposal ratings, B 
3 For ease of presentation, all the results for Study 2 are reported using
the median-split categories of predominant promotion pride or prevention
pride. Analyses using orthogonal promotion pride and prevention pride
scales and a separate interaction term for each yielded a similar pattern of
results, as did computing the categorical RFQ score using an absolute
median split instead of the sample-relative median split. We believe that
the categorical analysis has several advantages. Making it categorical
yields a single variable, which simplifies the analyses. Additionally, we are
conceptualizing the impact of the message strategy in terms of individuals
with real fit or nonfit with each strategy, which again argues for a
categorical approach. Finally, the categorical analysis makes the findings
of Study 2 more comparable with those of the other studies.
393 REGULATORY FIT AND PERSUASION1.20, t(80)  2.62, p  .01. Additionally, positive mood had its
own independent effect on perceived persuasiveness, B  0.30,
t(81)  3.25, p  .002, and opinion ratings, B  0.56, t(80) 
6.37, p  .001. Thus, independent of positive mood, which has its
own effects, regulatory fit influences perceived message persua-
siveness and opinions.
Study 2 extends the findings of Study 1 in several ways. Study
2 used a chronic individual difference measure of regulatory focus
(as well as different dependent variables), and the results were at
least as strong as in Study 1, where regulatory focus was experi-
mentally manipulated. Study 2 also demonstrated that the regula-
tory fit effect is distinct from and independent of positive mood.
Regulatory fit did not relate to positive mood, and fit effects were
observed even when positive mood was controlled for. Another
noteworthy aspect of Study 2 was that the persuasive message had
greater similarity across all of the conditions—only the strategic
means of framing certain sentences differed, which is a more
subtle manipulation. As with Study 1, the results of Study 2
support the conclusion that the type of strategic means used in a
persuasive message can vary in its fit with the regulatory orienta-
tion of the message recipient, and this can influence the perceived
persuasiveness of the message and agreement with its topic.
What Studies 1 and 2 do not directly show, however, is that the
influence of regulatory fit on persuasion is due to a transfer of
feeling right from regulatory fit. This was one major purpose of
Study 3. The other major purpose was to demonstrate the regula-
tory fit effect on persuasion when regulatory fit is induced before
participants even receive the message. Such an effect would not
follow from other compatibility viewpoints, such as a message-
matching viewpoint.
Study 3
The goal of this study was to demonstrate that misattribution or
transfer of the feeling right experience from regulatory fit to
evaluation in the persuasion context is the process by which
regulatory fit increases persuasion. This was accomplished, first,
by directly manipulating the states of regulatory fit and nonfit
separate from the persuasion context itself—indeed, prior to par-
ticipants even receiving the message. In this way, the impact of
regulatory fit on persuasion could be examined without message
content contributing to the effect in any way. Second, to test for the
hypothesized misattribution process or transfer of feeling right
from regulatory fit to evaluation in the persuasion context, partic-
ipants’ attention either was or was not drawn to the true source of
their feeling right experience prior to their receiving the message
(e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). If the feeling right experience from
regulatory fit transfers to the persuasion context because of source
confusion, as we hypothesize, then drawing participants’ attention
to the source of this fit experience before they receive the message
should reduce the confusion, thereby eliminating the fit effect on
persuasion. As evidence for evaluation in the persuasion context,
the feeling right experience would no longer be relevant because
its source was an event that occurred independent of the message.
Therefore, a Regulatory Fit  Attention Condition interaction
on participants’ postcommunication attitudes and perceived per-
suasiveness ratings is predicted. The standard condition in which
participants’ attention is not drawn to the source of the feeling
right experience should show the usual regulatory fit effect on
persuasion, replicating the previous two studies. To the extent that
this effect is due to the misattribution of feelings of rightness, the
condition drawing attention to the source of the feeling right
experience should eliminate this effect. Again, these effects should
be independent of positive mood.
Method
Participants and Design
One hundred thirty-nine students at Columbia University were recruited
through the use of flyers and voluntarily participated in exchange for $5.
The study was a 2 (regulatory fit condition: fit vs. nonfit)  2 (attention
condition: standard vs. attention to source of feeling right) between-
participants design. Seventeen participants (12.2%) scattered across the
experimental conditions failed to follow directions or complete the task and
were removed from the data analysis, leaving 64 men and 58 women.
There were no effects of gender.
Procedure
Participants were individually seated at a private cubicle and told they
would be participating in two allegedly unrelated studies. For the first
Figure 1. Mean ratings of perceived persuasiveness (A) and opinion of
proposal (B) by Regulatory Focus Questionnaire and type of essay means,
Study 2.
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sions of a regulatory fit manipulation questionnaire, designed to induce
either regulatory fit or nonfit. Immediately following this manipulation,
participants were randomly assigned to one of two attention conditions: the
standard condition (no attention directed to the source of the feeling right
experience) or the attention to feeling right condition (attention directed to
the source of the feeling right experience). For the supposed second study,
all participants read the same persuasive communication and completed the
dependent measures listed below. Participants were then debriefed and paid
for their participation. No participant expressed awareness of the two
studies being related.
Materials
Regulatory Fit Manipulation Questionnaire. Using a technique devel-
oped by Freitas and Higgins (2002), this questionnaire was designed to
induce either regulatory fit or nonfit. The regulatory fit conditions consist
of engaging in ideal (promotion focus) goal pursuit with eager means or
ought (prevention focus) goal pursuit with vigilant means. The regulatory
nonfit conditions consist of pairing ideal goal pursuit with vigilant means
or ought goal pursuit with eager means. The manipulation of regulatory fit
was accomplished by asking participants to first list either a current “hope
or aspiration” (promotion focus induction) or a current “duty or obligation”
(prevention focus induction) and then asking them to list several means
they could use to achieve this goal. The instructions for listing means
asked for either eager strategies (“Please list some strategies you could
use to make sure everything goes right ...”) or vigilant strategies (“Please
list some strategies you could use to avoid anything that could go wrong
...”). Beneath the means instructions were eight blank free-response lines.
Crossing goal type with means type yields four possible conditions: two fit
conditions and two nonfit conditions. Participants completed this task twice
for two different goals, keeping the type of goal/type of strategy condition
constant.
Attention manipulation. Participants were assigned to one of two at-
tention conditions. In the standard condition, which served as a replication
of the previous two studies, no instructions were given to direct attention
to the source of the feeling right experience following the regulatory fit
manipulation, thereby allowing for the misattribution or transfer of feeling
right from regulatory fit to the persuasion context. In the attention to
feeling right condition, immediately following the regulatory fit manipu-
lation, participants’ attention was directed to the correct source of their
feeling right experience with the following instructions: “Sometimes think-
ing about using the right means to attain each goal can make people ‘feel
right’ about their goal pursuit. On the following scale, indicate how much
you ‘feel right’ about your goal pursuit.” Participants then indicated their
response on a 6-point scale anchored at Not at all and Extremely.
Persuasive communication. All participants received an identical per-
suasive essay, a modified version of the message from Study 2. The critical
change involved rewriting the essay to remove the means-framing manip-
ulation, such that the message was now neutral with respect to matching
regulatory focus and was the same for everyone. For example, an eager
[vigilant] framed sentence such as, “The primary reason for supporting this
program is because it will advance [secure] children’s education and
support [prevent] more children to succeed [from failing],” would now
read, “The primary reason for supporting this program is because it will
supplement children’s education with the knowledge and skills important
for both school life and social life more generally.” Additionally, the essay
was substantially shortened to 374 words to help ensure that the effect of
having paid attention to the feeling right experience before the message
would remain throughout the length of reading the message.
Dependent Measures
Perceived persuasiveness of article. Participants responded to five
items (  .93) tapping their perceived persuasiveness of the communi-
cation. Items included, on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all)t o7( very),
how persuasive, convincing, compelling, influential, and effective they
found the article. Each participants’ mean for all five items was used in the
analyses.
Opinion of proposal. This served as the primary measure of partici-
pants’ attitude toward the program outlined in the persuasive message and
thus served as the measure of message impact on attitude. Each partici-
pants’ mean for the following four items (  .87) was taken as a measure
of their opinion of the proposed after-school program: “How supportive of
the program are you?”; “How good an idea do you think the program is?”;
“How necessary do you think the program is?”; and “What is your overall
opinion of the program?” Ratings were made on a 7-point scale from 1 (not
at all)t o7( very).
Attitude confidence rating. One item asked participants, “How confi-
dent are you in the ratings you just made (about your attitude towards the
proposal)?” on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all)t o7( very). Given present
interest in and demonstrated importance of attitude confidence and cer-
tainty (e.g., Tormala & Petty, 2002), we felt it worthwhile to investigate
how regulatory fit may influence this variable. Similar to our other depen-
dent measures, we predicted that the feeling right of regulatory fit would
increase attitude confidence when the misattribution of this feeling was not
eliminated.
Volunteer rating. One item asked participants, on a 7-point scale
anchored at 1 (not at all)a n d7( very), “If you had the chance to volunteer
for this program at a school near you, how likely would you be willing to
devote a couple hours per week to do so?” This served as yet another
measure of the impact of regulatory fit on attitudes, and it measured
hypothesized behavioral intention to act in correspondence with one’s
attitude.
Mood questionnaire. Nine items (  .90) tapping both high arousal
and low arousal positive moods were included to further demonstrate the
independence of feeling right from positive mood. Responses were given
on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all)t o7( very). Participants were asked
how good, happy, sad (reverse scored), relaxed, positive, cheerful, tense
(reverse scored), content, and energized they felt. A positive mood index
was created by computing the mean for all nine items.
Results and Discussion
Analysis Overview
The most relevant test of our transfer or misattribution hypoth-
esis is a significant Regulatory Fit (fit vs. nonfit)  Attention
Condition (standard vs. attention to feeling right) interaction, with
the effect of regulatory fit on persuasion being eliminated in the
attention to feeling right condition.
Perceived Persuasiveness
The means for participants’ ratings of perceived persuasiveness
were subject to a 2 (fit condition)  2 (attention condition)
ANOVA. Although all means reflected the predicted pattern
(Mstandard, fit  4.04, Mstandard, nonfit  3.73, Mfeeling right, fit  3.85, Mfeeling
right, nonfit  3.84), the interaction term did not achieve significance (F 
1).
Opinion of Proposal
The means for participants’ opinion of the program advocated in
the persuasive message as a function of regulatory fit and attention
condition are presented in Figure 2A. The central test of our
misattribution prediction concerns the Regulatory Fit  Attention
interaction. A 2  2 ANOVA yielded only a significant Regula-
tory Fit  Attention interaction, F(1, 118)  4.89, p  .03.
Planned contrasts revealed a significant difference between fit and
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in the fit condition (M  5.56, SD  1.05) giving more positive
opinion ratings than participants in the nonfit condition (M  4.96,
SD  1.18), t(118)  1.96, p  .05. This replicates the regula-
tory fit effect on persuasion found in Studies 1 and 2. Furthermore,
the significant interaction reflects the fact that the attention to
feeling right condition eliminated the regulatory fit effect. The
between-fit contrast within the attention to feeling right condition
(Mfit  4.76, SDfit  1.27; Mnonfit  5.11, SDnonfit  1.24) was not
significant, t(116)  1.16, p  .25, and was, if anything, slightly
reversed.
Attitude Confidence Ratings
Mean confidence ratings for all conditions are presented in
Figure 2B. To test if regulatory fit increases participants’ confi-
dence in the ratings they made regarding their opinion of the
proposal, and also whether attention to feeling right would elim-
inate this effect, confidence ratings served as the dependent vari-
able in a 2 (regulatory fit condition)  2 (attention condition)
ANOVA. Only a significant interaction was observed, F(1, 118) 
10.49, p  .002. Planned contrasts revealed two significant within-
attention differences. Within the standard condition, as expected,
participants in the fit condition (M  5.70, SD  .99) had higher
confidence than those in the nonfit condition (M  5.21, SD 
1.14) , t(118)  1.87, p  .06. This pattern was reversed for
participants in the attention to feeling right condition, with partic-
ipants in the fit condition showing lower ratings (M  5.08, SD 
.87) than those in the nonfit condition (M  5.78, SD  1.01),
t(118)  2.72, p  .008. Thus, when the misattribution or transfer
of feeling right from regulatory fit is blocked, the effect on
confidence ratings is eliminated, and even reversed.
Volunteer Ratings
Volunteer ratings were submitted to the same 2  2 ANOVA.
Only the interaction term approached significance, F(1, 118) 
2.86, p  .09. The pattern of means mimicked that of the previous
analysis of persuasion, with the standard condition showing larger
volunteer ratings for fit (M  4.89, SD  1.78) than nonfit (M 
4.15, SD  1.48), t(118)  1.72, p  .09, and the attention to
feeling right condition showing, if anything, nonsignificantly
larger volunteer ratings for nonfit (M  4.31, SD  1.84) than fit
(M  4.03, SD  1.50).
Regulatory Fit and Positive Mood: Independent Effects
A series of analyses were conducted to demonstrate further the
independence of regulatory fit from positive mood. First, a t test
revealed that ratings on the positive mood index did not vary as a
function of regulatory fit (Mfit  4.74, SDfit  1.05; Mnonfit 
4.75, SDnonfit  1.17; t  1). Next, the above ANOVAs for each
dependent variable were repeated with multiple regressions that
included the positive mood index. The first analysis regressed
opinion of proposal scores on a dummy-coded regulatory fit vari-
able (nonfit [0] vs. fit [1]), an attention condition variable (stan-
dard [0] vs. attention to feeling right [1]), a Regulatory Fit 
Attention interaction term, and mood ratings (centered). Mood had
an independent, significant relation to opinion scores, B  0.26,
t(117)  2.62, p  .01, with more positive moods relating to more
positive ratings of the proposal. Additionally, the Regulatory Fit 
Attention interaction still remained significant, B  1.07,
t(117)  2.52, p  .01.
The second regression analysis regressed opinion of proposal
scores on the regulatory fit dummy variable and positive mood
ratings for participants in the standard attention condition only.
Two significant results were again found. As in Study 2, increased
positive mood related to more positive opinion ratings, B  0.26,
t(57)  2.13, p  .04, and participants in the regulatory fit
condition still had significantly more positive opinions than par-
ticipants in the regulatory nonfit condition, B  0.66, t(57)  2.33,
p  .02. As in Study 2, the effect of regulatory fit was independent
of positive mood, which had its own significant effect on opinion
scores.
Next, confidence ratings were submitted to the same two mul-
tiple regression analyses with the predictor variables listed above.
For the first analysis, mood had its own independent effect on
confidence, B  0.22, t(117)  2.65, p  .009, and the Regulatory
Fit  Attention interaction variable remained significant, B 
1.29, t(117)  3.57, p  .001. For the second analysis testing
the regulatory fit effect within the standard attention condition
Figure 2. Mean ratings of opinion of proposal (A) and attitude confi-
dence (B) by attention condition and fit condition, Study 3.
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conditions of regulatory fit, B  0.54, t(57)  1.99, p  .05, had
independent, significant effects on confidence.
Finally, volunteer ratings served as the dependent variable in the
multiple regressions as listed above. Although the effect of posi-
tive mood was not reliably significant, B  0.21, t(117)  1.49,
p  .14, the regulatory fit interaction was near significance, B 
1.11, t(117)  1.89, p  .07. This pattern held when testing
the standard attention condition only, again with positive mood
nonsignificantly related, B  0.28, t(57)  1.59, p  .12, and
regulatory fit having an independent effect on volunteer ratings,
B  0.80, t(57)  1.91, p  .06.
Study 3 extends the evidence for the regulatory fit effect on
persuasion in several ways. The misattribution design provided
support for the claim that regulatory fit effects are due to the
transfer of feeling right to the persuasion experience. It also
demonstrated that regulatory fit can influence participants’ confi-
dence in their attitudes and their intention to perform a behavior
consonant with the topic of the communication. It also provided
further evidence that the experience of regulatory fit is distinct
from positive mood, with each having independent effects on
persuasion. Finally, manipulating regulatory fit outside of the
persuasion context clearly distinguishes regulatory fit effects from
message-matching effects in persuasion, because all participants
received identical messages after fit was induced.
One issue raised by the results of Study 3 is why, in the standard
condition, regulatory fit did not influence perceived persuasiveness
ratings (as in Studies 1 and 2) but again significantly affected
opinions. Because the overall pattern of results for perceived
persuasiveness in Study 3 was in the same direction as in Studies
1 and 2, it is possible that the failure to reach significance simply
reflected variability in the size of the fit effect over studies. Indeed,
as discussed later, a meta-analysis across all four studies did show
a highly reliable effect of fit on perceived persuasiveness. The
weaker effect did, however, make us consider more generally other
factors that could influence the size and direction of the fit effect.
One possibility is that in Study 3, as discussed in the introduc-
tion, the feeling right experience transferred directly to attitudes
toward the proposal and not to the evaluations of the message
itself. It may also be the case that the impact of fit depends on
participants’ reactions to the message. In considering why there
was less of a fit effect on perceived persuasiveness in Study 3, it
occurred to us that a modification in our persuasive message for
Study 3 may have changed how participants experienced it. Be-
cause we wished to shorten the length of the essay, a significant
number of details about the after-school program were removed. In
particular, many of the positive consequences of the after-school
program described in the original Study 2 essay were removed for
Study 3. This produced an essay that was more vague and less
positive than in Study 2 and thus one that could potentially induce
more negative thoughts. (Indeed, mean perceived persuasiveness
ratings were lower in Study 3 than in Study 2.)
Both of these potential factors suggested a new study that could
examine more deeply the influence on persuasion of the subjective
feeling right experience. As discussed in the introduction, for
participants generating negative thoughts in response to a message,
the information afforded by the feeling right of regulatory fit
would have consequences that are exactly opposite to those par-
ticipants generating positive thoughts. If participants are generat-
ing positive thoughts, their experience of feeling right about those
positive thoughts would signal agreement with the message and
increase perceived persuasiveness ratings. In contrast, if partici-
pants are generating negative thoughts, their experience of feeling
right about those negative thoughts would signal disagreement
with the message and therefore lower perceived persuasiveness
ratings. Such predictions are analogous to the effect of thought
confidence on persuasion, where increased confidence in positive
thoughts and increased confidence in negative thoughts have op-
posite effects (Petty, Brin ˜ol, & Tormala, 2002).
In Study 3, message-related thoughts may have influenced rat-
ings of perceived message persuasiveness but not opinions toward
the advocated proposal. One way in which message-related
thoughts should more strongly predict opinions of the proposal is
to call participants’ attention to their perceptions of the message
itself. Directing participants’ attention to their evaluations of the
persuasiveness of a message should make them more likely to
utilize message-related thoughts when subsequently forming an
opinion toward the advocated proposal. In contrast, directing par-
ticipants to think only about their opinion of the advocated pro-
posal, rather than the persuasiveness of the message, should make
message-related thoughts less important in determining one’s
attitude.
The purpose of Study 4 was to explicitly test these predictions
in two ways. First, we provided participants with a thought-listing
measure in which they could reveal both positive and negative
cognitive responses to the message. Second, the attention of the
participants was repeatedly directed to either the persuasiveness of
the message or their opinion of the advocated proposal.
Study 4
There were several goals of this study. First, we wished to show
that regulatory fit can interact with message-related thoughts in a
theoretically meaningful way, such that the information provided
by the subjective experience of fit can either increase or decrease
perceived persuasiveness and opinion, depending on whether
thoughts in response to the message are positive or negative,
respectively. This predicts an interaction of regulatory fit and
favorability of message-related thoughts (positive thoughts minus
negative thoughts) on both perceived persuasiveness and opinions.
Second, we wished to show that the effect of message-related
thoughts on perceived persuasiveness and opinions may vary de-
pending on which aspect of the persuasion experience attention is
directed. To the extent that participants are attending to the mes-
sage itself, the regulatory fit effect should interact with thought
favorability when predicting persuasiveness and opinions. To the
extent that participants are attending to the advocated proposal
itself rather than the message per se, the regulatory fit effect should
not interact with thought favorability, and just the standard regu-
latory fit effect should be observed. These are the major predic-
tions of Study 4.
Method
Participants and Design
Ninety-nine Columbia University students participated in return for $5.
Five participants were removed for either trying to guess the purpose of the
study or not following instructions, leaving 47 men and 47 women. No
gender differences were found on the primary dependent variables. The
397 REGULATORY FIT AND PERSUASIONstudy was a 2 (regulatory fit: fit vs. nonfit)  2 (directed attention: message
vs. proposal) between-participants design.
Procedure
Participants were seated in individual soundproof booths and given an
informed consent document, which contained the first of three instances for
the directed-attention variable manipulation. They read that the experiment
contained two unrelated studies, the first of which involved answering a
few questions about themselves. They then read one of two descriptions for
the second study, leading them to believe they would answer questions
about either how persuasive they found a message to be or their attitudes
toward the proposal of a message. After participants signed informed
consent, the experimenter then verbally repeated the purpose of the two
studies, again including the manipulated directed-attention instructions.
Each participant was then randomly assigned to one of four versions of
the regulatory fit manipulation used in Study 3, producing either regulatory
fit or regulatory nonfit. Following completion, participants were then given
the persuasive message, with the written instructions at the start of the
message strongly encouraging participants to either pay attention to the
persuasiveness of the message or to their attitude toward the proposal. The
dependent variables followed the message, in the order listed below.
Participants were paid and debriefed.
Materials
Regulatory Fit Manipulation Questionnaire. The manipulation of reg-
ulatory fit and nonfit conditions was achieved through the same question-
naire as described in Study 3.
Directed attention manipulation. Three occasions throughout the ex-
periment directed the attention of the participants to either the persuasive-
ness of the message or their attitudes toward the message proposal. In-
structions for directing attention to the message were as follows: “You will
be given an essay and asked how persuasive you found it.” Instructions for
directing attention to the message proposal were as follows: “You will be
given an article about a policy proposal and asked what your attitude
toward the policy proposal is.” The informed consent form, a verbal
description of the study from the experimenter, and the instructions at the
beginning of the message were all consistently framed for one condition or
the other.
Persuasive communication. All participants received the same mes-
sage used in Study 3.
Dependent Measures
Perceived persuasiveness of message. Four items tapped participants’
perceived persuasiveness of the message. On a scale from 1 (not at all)t o
7( very), participants rated how persuasive, compelling, influential, and
coherent they found the message (  .83). Mean responses for these items
served as the dependent measure.
Opinion of proposal. This was the primary measure of participants’
postcommunication attitudes. Participants rated their “overall opinion of
the program” on a scale from 1 (not at all positive)t o7( very positive).
Thought Listing Measure. As in previous studies using this measure
(e.g., Brin ˜ol & Petty, 2003), participants were given a page with four empty
boxes and instructed to list between one and four “thoughts about the
possible consequences of the after-school program proposal,” without
regard to spelling or grammar. After listing their thoughts, participants
were then asked to rate each of their responses as positive, negative, or
neutral; examples were provided. They were then asked to rate their
confidence in each thought on a scale from 1 (not at all confident)t o9
(extremely confident). Responses were checked to ensure that (a) all
thoughts were message-related and (b) the correct valence was assigned to
each thought. An index of thought favorability was created by subtracting
unfavorable thoughts from favorable thoughts and dividing by the total
number of thoughts. This variable was centered prior to analyses.
Results and Discussion
Analysis Overview
Our prediction that the interaction between regulatory fit and
favorability of thoughts would depend on participants’ directed
attention should yield a three-way interaction. Regulatory fit (0 
nonfit; 1  fit), directed attention (0  message; 1  proposal),
and favorability of thoughts (continuous) were first entered into a
regression analysis, followed by all two-way interactions, and
finally the three-way interaction. The only significant term to
emerge from these analyses was the predicted three-way interac-
tion for both perceived persuasiveness, B  1.87, t(85)  2.66,
p  .009, and opinion of the proposal, B  1.88, t(85)  2.06,
p  .04.
4 To probe the nature of these interactions further, we
separated the sample by directed-attention condition and pro-
ceeded to analyze the Regulatory Fit  Favorability effect sepa-
rately for each.
Message-Directed Condition Only
The prediction for the message-directed condition was that the
regulatory fit effect would interact with thought favorability. Spe-
cifically, as thought favorability increases, feeling right from reg-
ulatory fit should increase perceived persuasiveness and increase
opinions toward the advocated proposal; stated in complementary
terms, as thought favorability decreases, feeling right should de-
crease perceived persuasiveness and decrease opinions toward the
advocated proposal. This predicted pattern was obtained. Ratings
of perceived persuasiveness served as the dependent variable in a
first regression with regulatory fit and favorability of thoughts
(continuous) and in a second regression with the relevant interac-
tion term included. No main effects were observed (ts  1.31), but
the interaction term was significant, B  1.13, t(39)  2.25, p 
.03, indicating that the effect of regulatory fit differed depending
on direction of thought favorability. Figure 3A displays the simple
regression lines illustrating this interaction; following Aiken and
West (1991), the three values of the thought favorability index
chosen to plot relevant interactions were the mean, 1 standard
deviation below the mean, and 1 standard deviation above the
mean. Tests of the simple slopes revealed that under conditions of
fit, as thought favorability increased, perceived persuasiveness
significantly increased, B  0.92, t(39)  2.57, p  .01. The slope
of the nonfit line did not significantly differ from zero.
The same set of analyses were again conducted with opinion of
the proposal ratings. No main effects were observed (ts  .50), but
the interaction term was significant, B  1.36, t(39)  2.14, p 
.04. As illustrated in Figure 3B, participants in fit conditions gave
more positive opinions as favorability of thoughts increased, B 
0.86, t(39)  1.89, p  .06. The slope of the nonfit line did not
differ from zero. In sum, as predicted, when participants were
experiencing feeling right from regulatory fit, positive thoughts
resulted in increased ratings of persuasiveness and opinion of the
proposal, and negative thoughts resulted in decreased ratings.
Proposal-Directed Condition Only
The prediction for the proposal-directed condition was that the
regulatory fit effect would not interact with thought favorability.
4 For perceived persuasiveness ratings, a nearly significant main effect
of regulatory fit, B  0.46, t(89)  1.88, p  .06, also emerged.
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for the same series of regressions. The results are displayed in
Figure 4A. The only significant effect from these regressions was
a main effect of fit condition, B  0.80, t(47)  2.51, p  .02, such
that participants in fit conditions gave higher ratings (M  4.57)
than participants in nonfit conditions (M  3.77). As predicted,
there was no interaction of regulatory fit with thought favorability.
Neither slope of the simple regression lines differed significantly
from zero.
Results from the same series of regressions with participants’
opinion of the proposal are displayed in Figure 4B. Again, only a
main effect of fit achieved significance, B  0.83, t(47)  2.00,
p  .05, reflecting the fact that participants in fit conditions had
more positive opinions (M  5.69) than participants in nonfit
conditions (M  4.86). As predicted, there was no interaction of
regulatory fit with thought favorability. Neither slope differed
significantly from zero.
The results of Study 4 supported the predictions. When partic-
ipants were directed to pay attention to the persuasiveness of the
message, valence of message-related thoughts interacted with reg-
ulatory fit such that feeling right about positive thoughts resulted
in increased perceived persuasiveness and opinions, and feeling
right about negative thoughts resulted in decreased persuasiveness
and opinions. When participants were instead directed to pay
attention to their opinion of the proposal, message-related thoughts
played little role in determining perceived persuasiveness and
opinions, and instead, there was simply a direct effect on persua-
sion from regulatory fit.
General Discussion and Conclusions
The influence of one’s subjective experience on attitude forma-
tion and attitude change was investigated by early theorists (e.g.,
Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953) and continues today. We present
four studies that provide initial evidence for the importance of a
new subjective experience in persuasion research—feeling right
from regulatory fit. Like other experiences, this regulatory fit
experience can be misattributed or transferred to the persuasion
context, thereby increasing perceived message persuasiveness
and/or opinions toward the advocated proposal.
Studies 1 and 2 manipulated regulatory fit by relating partici-
pants’ promotion or prevention focus to the eager or vigilant
framing of a persuasive message. Studies 3 and 4 used a different
design in which regulatory fit was induced before participants
received the message, which was the same for everyone. Across
these cases, regulatory fit generally increased persuasion. Study 3
Figure 4. Regulatory fit and nonfit conditions by thought favorability.
Simple slope regression lines predict perceived message persuasiveness
(A) and opinion of topic (B) in the proposal-directed condition, Study 4.
Figure 3. Regulatory fit and nonfit conditions by thought favorability.
Simple slope regression lines predict perceived message persuasiveness
(A) and opinion of topic (B) in the message-directed condition, Study 4.
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transfers to the persuasion experience like other kinds of misattri-
bution found in the literature. Study 4 began to examine more
deeply how feeling right from regulatory fit can influence persua-
sion by considering both the valence of participants’ thoughts in
response to the message and the focus of their attention to either
the message or the advocated proposal.
A meta-analysis across all four studies (including only the
standard condition for Study 3 and the proposal-directed condition
for Study 4) revealed a strong effect of regulatory fit on both
perceived persuasiveness and message effectiveness, with in-
creased ratings under regulatory fit conditions compared with
regulatory nonfit conditions. For the measure of perceived persua-
siveness (Study 1: believability; Studies 2–4: perceived persua-
siveness index), participants experiencing regulatory fit found the
messages more persuasive than participants experiencing nonfit
(Z  3.21, p  .003). For the measure of message effectiveness
(Study 1: intention; Studies 2 and 4: overall opinion; Study 3:
opinion index), the message had a greater impact for participants
in regulatory fit conditions than for participants in regulatory
nonfit conditions (Z  4.92, p  .001). In addition, Study 3
obtained a conceptually related finding for confidence. As would
be expected if feeling right from regulatory fit transferred to the
message experience such that participants felt right about what it
was advocating, participants in the standard attention condition
were more confident in the ratings they made regarding their
(higher) opinion of the proposal.
Although we generally predict feeling right from regulatory fit
to increase persuasion, it will not necessarily do so, as Study 4
shows. According to the “mood-as-input” extension of the mood-
as-information approach (Martin & Stoner, 1996; Martin, Ward,
Achee, & Wyer, 1993), feelings in and of themselves have no
particular information-processing implications. Instead, feelings
have implications only as they are interpreted in a given context.
Analogously, the persuasive impact of feeling right from regula-
tory fit would depend on how this feeling is interpreted, and this
interpretation may depend on various factors, including the va-
lence of message-related thoughts. Feeling right about negative
thoughts should lead to decreased persuasion, and feeling right
about positive thoughts should lead to increased persuasion, pre-
dictions confirmed in Study 4.
Other instructions and manipulations might also produce a pat-
tern of opposite effects for regulatory fit. What if message recip-
ients were told to respond thoughtfully to the message and that
feelings could have a potentially biasing effect on their judgments?
In this case, regulatory fit conditions might decrease persuasion if
feeling right about the message is interpreted negatively. For
example, task instructions could alert participants to avoid “emo-
tional” or experiential feelings when making judgments, thereby
causing feelings of rightness to arouse suspicion. During a subse-
quent evaluation of the “judged usability” of these feelings (see
Higgins, 1996; 1998a), participants might infer the feelings to be
inappropriate and correct for a perceived biasing influence in the
message, thereby reducing its effectiveness.
A similar effect has been predicted for superyielding, a situation
in which an experience of excessively high yielding may produce
inferences about being manipulated in some way, thereby lowering
the validity of the persuasive communication (Higgins, 1998a).
The flexible correction model provides similar predictions, in
which overcorrecting for a perceived (yet not actually present) bias
can lead dislikable sources to be more influential than likable
sources (Petty, Wegener, & White, 1998, Study 2; see also Martin
& Achee, 1992). Indeed, when the regulatory fit effect on persua-
sion was eliminated in Study 3 by having participants attend to the
correct source of their feeling right from regulatory fit prior to
receiving the message, confidence was higher in the nonfit condi-
tion than in the fit condition. This reversal effect could be a version
of overcorrection that occurs when people pay attention to and
then become concerned about a possible bias in their judgments
(e.g., Martin & Achee, 1992; Petty & Wegener, 1993)—in this
case, a bias in their acceptance of the message’s position because
of their feeling right from regulatory fit.
Although we chose regulatory focus as the motivational orien-
tation with which to investigate a regulatory fit effect on persua-
sion, this effect need not be limited to these orientations. A
regulatory fit effect on persuasion could occur whenever the means
used to advocate a behavior or policy in a message suits the
message recipient’s self-regulatory orientation, be it a locomotion
versus assessment orientation (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2000), a near
versus distant temporal construal (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2000),
or a deliberative versus implementative action mind-set (e.g.,
Gollwitzer, 1990). For example, message recipients could be in
either a locomotion orientation, which constitutes the aspect of
self-regulation that is concerned with movement from state to
state, or an assessment orientation, which constitutes the aspect of
self-regulation that is concerned with making comparisons (see
Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003). A message could advocate
that one policy is better than its alternatives with either a progres-
sive elimination strategy (i.e., eliminate the worst competing al-
ternative with respect to each successive attribute for a set of
attributes until only the advocated policy remains) or a full eval-
uation strategy (i.e., make a full comparison among all of the
alternatives for all of the attributes and show that the advocated
policy is the best overall). Persuasion should be greatest when
there is a fit between regulatory mode orientation and advocacy
means (assessment/full evaluation and locomotion/progressive
elimination; cf. Avnet & Higgins, 2003).
Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that a regulatory fit effect on
persuasion can occur even when the fit is induced prior to partic-
ipants’ receiving the same persuasive message (as long as their
attention is not directed toward the true source of their feeling right
experience). This fit effect on persuasion is especially important
because it distinguishes regulatory fit from other forms of com-
patibility between individuals’ orientations and message content
that can also increase persuasion. Perhaps the best known of these
is message matching, which we briefly mention in our
introduction.
Matching the content or outcome of a persuasive message to
some aspect of the message recipient’s cognitive, motivational, or
affective system can influence persuasion. Although message
matching typically increases the persuasive impact of a message,
Petty and Wegener (1998; see also Petty et al., 2000) used the
elaboration likelihood model framework to show that message
matching enhances message scrutiny, at least for attitude function
matching. To the extent that the arguments contained in a persua-
sive message are of high quality, this will increase message im-
pact, but if the arguments are of poor quality, message matching
actually reduces attitude change.
As evident from Studies 3 and 4, the regulatory fit effect on
persuasion does not depend on the relation between individuals’
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can occur when the experience of feeling right from regulatory fit
occurs prior to the message even being received. Thus, the regu-
latory fit effect is not the same as the message-matching effect on
persuasion. However, what about when, as in Studies 1 and 2,
regulatory fit is induced by the relation between the regulatory
focus of the participants and the strategic manner of the message
advocacy? Should the fit effect in these studies be considered a
special case of a message-matching effect? In order to understand
why we do not believe this, it is necessary to distinguish between
two different ways that individuals’ regulatory states or orienta-
tions can create value (see Higgins, 2002).
5
The first way that individuals’ orientations can create value is
through relevance, which concerns the relation between a personal
orientation and the extent to which goal attainment (outcome) will
satisfy that orientation. In decision making, for example, this
would involve whether the outcome of a decision satisfies some
orienting concern or need of the decision maker. Relevance relates
personal orientation and outcome, and it influences the perceived
value and importance of the outcome. The second way that indi-
viduals’ orientations can create value is through regulatory fit,
which concerns the relation between a personal orientation and the
strategic manner of goal pursuit.
These two ways of creating value in relation to individuals’
orientations differ in whether value is created by the strategic
process sustaining the orientation (fit) or by the outcome satisfying
the orientation need (relevance). The typical message-matching
study on attitude functions has messages about different outcomes
that serve different functions, such as messages about different
properties of a washing machine that serve either a utilitarian (low
cost) or value-based (environmentally friendly) function. The out-
comes described in different messages are relevant to different
needs or concerns of the recipient.
6 Regulatory relevance studies
can also be conducted for promotion versus prevention orienta-
tions, such as describing the advanced technology properties of a
camera (satisfying promotion) or its reliability properties (satisfy-
ing prevention). However, these relevance studies are different
from regulatory fit studies (see Higgins, 2002). Fit studies vary the
strategic manner of goal pursuit while controlling for outcome. In
Study 2, for example, the outcomes of the new after-school pro-
gram were exactly the same in the eager and vigilant means
conditions.
We present here four studies demonstrating the importance of
regulatory fit for persuasion. The results of our studies support the
proposal that the experience of feeling right from regulatory fit can
transfer to the persuasion context, thereby influencing perceived
message persuasiveness and opinions. This can happen even when
the regulatory fit occurs prior to the message being received. The
fit effect on persuasion can also be eliminated by drawing attention
to regulatory fit as the source of the feeling right experience, or
even reversed when message recipients feel right about their
negative reactions to the message. An interesting implication of the
fit effect on persuasion is that in order to increase persuasion, it is
not necessary to shape the message content to match the idiosyn-
cratic, personal characteristics of the message recipient because
regulatory fit can be situationally induced prior to the message
being received—a message that can be the same for everyone. Like
all persuasion techniques, the conditions under which regulatory fit
influences persuasion, and the different mechanisms that deter-
mine the strength and direction of its influence, need to be iden-
tified and investigated in future research.
5 A third type, value from proper means, is not discussed here (see
Higgins, 2002).
6 This explanation for why matched messages are important for persua-
sion is consistent with Petty and Wegener’s (1998) work demonstrating
increased message scrutiny with matched messages. If a message is per-
ceived as fulfilling an important need or satisfying a central concern, it
could serve to direct increased attention toward the message, resulting in
greater message scrutiny.
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Study 1 Promotion Focus Communication in [Eager/Vigilant] Formats
[EAT/NEGLECT TO EAT] FRUITS AND VEGETABLES
AND YOU [WILL/WON’T] FEEL ACCOMPLISHED!
A diet that [is/is not] rich in essential nutrients, like those found in fruits
and vegetables, has direct effects on the biochemistry of the brain, resulting
in [increased/a lost opportunity for increased] energy, better moods, and a
general sense of happiness and fulfillment. People who [do/do not] eat a
balanced diet, of which fruits and vegetables are an integral part, can
[experience/miss out on experiencing] greater confidence and optimism,
which [in turn makes/would have in turn made] them more appealing to
others as well as successful in their endeavors. [Having/Not having] an
adequate supply of nutrients in the bloodstream [is also important for
maintaining/results in a failure to maintain] attractive hair and skin, and
[promotes/does not promote] an active metabolism, [which/which when
active] burns fat and contributes to an overall toned and attractive body.
The vitamins and minerals found in fruits and vegetables provide the
nourishment necessary for greater concentration and attentiveness, and
maximizing mental abilities and creativity. [Good nutrition/By not main-
taining good nutrition] [can have a/you will not benefit from the] substan-
tial positive effect on test performance and IQ (intelligence) scoring. If you
[eat/do not eat] the right amount of fruits and vegetables daily, you
[can/will not] experience an overall sense of feeling good about yourself.
Appendix B
Study 1 Prevention Focus Communication in [Eager/Vigilant] Formats
[EAT/NEGLECT TO EAT] FRUITS AND VEGETABLES
AND [ENJOY/YOU’LL MISS] THE SAFETY
OF GOOD HEALTH!
Human beings require a whole regimen of nutrients for basic good
health. [Eating/Not eating] fruits and vegetables [supplies/results in a
failure to supply] the body with the nutrients it needs, [enabling/and
will not enable] the body to produce substances from within which
buffer it from the physical demands of the world we live in (pollution,
daily stress, bad weather, etc.). The vitamins and minerals found in
fruits and vegetables are known to play a protective role, and help to
repair already damaged tissues. [Eating/If you do not eat] fruits and
vegetables [helps/you will not help] to facilitate the actions of the
immune system, which [works/then cannot work] to keep you healthy
and safe from illness. A [well-nourished immune system/immune sys-
tem that is not well nourished] [stops/does not stop] pathogens (poi-
sons) and neutralizes their toxins, and [forms/does not form] a barrier
against invading bacteria to prevent their spread. [Certain vegetables
have even been shown to be effective in protecting the body from
cancer and heart disease/Not eating certain vegetables means you will
miss an opportunity to obtain nutrients which are effective in protecting
the body from cancer and heart disease.] [The/If you do not take in the]
nutrients found in fruits and vegetables [also/you cannot] contribute to
healthy teeth, gums, and bones. If you [eat/do not eat] the right amount
of fruits and vegetables, you [can/cannot] actively help keep yourself
safe from illness and obtain overall good health.
Appendix C
Study 2 Persuasive Communication in [Eager/Vigilant] Formats
NEW STUDENT AFTER-SCHOOL PROGRAM
This essay is written to advocate a new proposed citywide policy change
involving the New York Public School system and the city of New York.
A new city tax would be applied toward the development and implemen-
tation of a special after-school program for public grade- and high-school
level students. The primary reason for supporting this program is because
it will [advance/secure] children’s education and [support/prevent] more
children [to succeed/from failing]. If this program is initialized there will
be a [greater/lower] number of schoolchildren who [complete/fail to com-
plete] the full K–12 education program, and there will be a [greater/lower]
number of students who [succeed/fail] in their post-academic life choices
as well. Given the [higher rate of success/lower rate of failure] which this
program would ensure, it is important to develop this [achievement/pre-
vention] program as soon as possible.
The primary goal of this program is to [ensure success/prevent failures]
for the city’s youth, and it would focus on improving both academic and
practical skills. There would be several steps taken to ensure the success of
this program in meeting its goal. First, teachers from individual schools
would meet to design a program tailored specifically to the needs of that
student body. After faculty and administration identified factors which
would help [promote achievement/avert failure] of students at that school,
they would design a program which focused specifically on these domain
topics. However, the content of a given program would not be limited to
any specific topic. Assistance for any issue which the student believes
would [help him or her succeed/prevent him or her from failing] can be
addressed in these sessions. Thus, special training could be provided in
nearly any academic and relevant practical domain. This design allows for
the program to be both specific and broad in terms of the targeted topics
which [promote/prevent] student success.
Another noteworthy aspect of this program will be its comprehensive
content, which will include both academic and non-academic domains. In
this way, a broader scope of topics necessary for [success/the prevention of
failure] can be covered. The program, therefore, will focus not only on
important academic qualities but also on important social aspects of a
student’s life. Assistance can be provided for students who wish to receive
help with interpersonal skills, emotional difficulties, or any number of
social and psychological issues with which they may need help. In addition
to the standard academic skills covered in such programs, other less-
emphasized topics can be targeted as well; these include topics such as the
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(Appendixes continue)creative arts (music, painting, etc.), industrial arts (woodworking, mechan-
ics, etc.), home economics, and others. Such a broad skill base allows for
the development of the whole person, not just single-aspects of one’s life.
Given this far-reaching knowledge base, student [success/failure] levels
will be [greater/smaller] because all aspects of the individual can be
refined.
Another step taken to ensure the success of this program will be the
method by which students are selected to participate. Students can either
decide by themselves that they wish to participate in the program or can be
recommended for participation by a teacher or administrator. Utilizing both
methods of participation will [allow a greater number of students/prevent
less students from missing the opportunity] to participate, and therefore
there will be a [higher/lower] percentage of students [succeeding/failing]
following implementation of the program.
Finally, it is important to consider the issue of the extra tax needed to
fund this project. The personal cost of funding this program is far out-
weighed by the many potential [benefits/costs] this program will [promote/
avert]. In fact it is estimated that for every dollar spent on this program
now, 3.5 extra dollars will be [available in the future due to higher safety
rates/saved in future costs due to lower crime rates] and [greater/lower]
numbers of people [lacking/with] financial assistance needs. [Greater stu-
dent successes/Reduced student failures] now result in [greater benefits/
reduced costs] for everyone, including those same students and other
citizens, later.
In conclusion, it is important that we develop and back a special
after-school program for the grade- and high-school level students of NYC,
to be funded by a new city-wide tax. [By helping students to achieve/By
preventing the failure of students to meet] their academic and social
potential, we will have a [greater/lower] number of students [succeeding/
failing] in both academic and post-academic life. This includes an [in-
creased/decreased] number of students [finishing/failing to finish] their
K-12 education program, a [greater/smaller] number of students [attending/
not attending] post-high school education programs, and, overall, [students
receiving/less students failing to receive] more fulfilling and higher paying
jobs. This program can be an effective way of providing the assistance
needed to students to [raise/lower] the overall level of [success/failure] in
our public school system.
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